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Moral behavior requires learning how our actions help or harm
others. Theoretical accounts of learning propose a key division
between “model-free” algorithms that cache outcome values in
actions and “model-based” algorithms that map actions to out-
comes. Here, we tested the engagement of these mechanisms
and their neural basis as participants learned to avoid painful elec-
tric shocks for themselves and a stranger. We found that model-
free decision making was prioritized when learning to avoid harm-
ing others compared to oneself. Model-free prediction errors for
others relative to self were tracked in the thalamus/caudate. At
the time of choice, neural activity consistent with model-free
moral learning was observed in subgenual anterior cingulate cor-
tex (sgACC), and switching after harming others was associated
with stronger connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex. Finally, model-free moral learning varied with indi-
vidual differences in moral judgment. Our findings suggest moral
learning favors efficiency over flexibility and is underpinned by
specific neural mechanisms.
moral | learning | model-free | prediction error | neuroimaging
Acentral component of human morality is a prohibitionagainst harming others (1, 2). People readily avoid actions
that might harm another person (3–7), and this basic harm
aversion is so strong that many people even find it distressing to
perform pretend harmful actions, such as shooting someone with
a fake gun (8). Harm aversion is disrupted in clinical disorders
such as psychopathy that have a strong developmental compo-
nent (9), and although harm aversion is robust in healthy adults,
anyone who has watched young children fighting over a coveted
toy knows that such an aversion is not present from birth. In-
deed, a large literature documents the emergence of moral
conduct over the course of development (7, 10, 11). Cross-
cultural differences in morality suggest moral behavior is fine-
tuned to local environmental demands (12), and laboratory ex-
periments demonstrate how individuals can quickly adapt moral
behavior to changing norms (13, 14). All this evidence highlights
a critical role for learning in the development of harm aversion
and moral behavior more broadly (6). Once having learned as
children that harming others is morally wrong, adults still need to
learn which actions to take to avoid harm in novel contexts.
Recent work in computational neuroscience has advanced our
knowledge of how organisms learn the value of actions and
outcomes via reward and punishment (15, 16). An important
theoretical distinction has been made between “model-based”
and “model-free” learning systems (17, 18). Model-based
learning is often described as deliberative learning, whereas
model-free learning is thought to be habitual. The model-based
system builds a “world model” of the environment and selects
actions by prospectively searching the model for the best course
of action (19, 20). In contrast, the computationally efficient
model-free system assigns values to actions simply through trial
and error. The distinction between these systems can be illus-
trated by giving the example of how we navigate home from
work. The model-based system could easily replan if a particular
route home was unexpectedly blocked, whereas a purely model-
free learner can only plan a route home by directly experiencing
each of the different routes (21). These two systems are also
somewhat neurally dissociable, with model-based learning pref-
erentially engaging lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), posterior
parietal cortex, and caudate (20, 22, 23) and model-free learning
preferentially engaging putamen (24, 25), although both systems
update their representations via prediction errors encoded in
overlapping regions of ventral striatum (20). Model-based and
model-free systems often make similar recommendations about
which actions are more valuable, but when they conflict an ar-
bitration process allocates control between them (12, 13, 23, 26,
27). However, despite extensive theorizing that the model-based/
model-free distinction may help to characterize puzzling features
of moral learning and decision making (3, 28–30), it remains
unknown whether the moral consequences of actions affect the
balance between model-based and model-free control, and
whether common or distinct neural processes are engaged when
learning to avoid harmful outcomes to self and others.
Past work on the neural basis of moral decision making pro-
vides support for competing hypotheses. On the one hand, the
sophistication of human morality seems to demand the kinds of
complex representations afforded by model-based learning,
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suggesting learning to avoid harming others may preferentially
engage the model-based system. Supporting this view, people are
easily able to learn to avoid harmful actions without directly
experiencing their outcomes, in line with a model-based learning
strategy when avoiding harm to others (3, 28, 31). Moreover,
moral decision making in healthy adults consistently engages
brain regions most strongly associated with the model-based
system, including LPFC, caudate, and temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) (24, 26, 32). Deciding to follow moral norms like fairness
and honesty, and enforcing those norms on others via costly
punishment, engages LPFC (33–38), and disrupting LPFC
function reduces moral norm compliance and enforcement (39,
40). During decisions to avoid harming others, LPFC encodes
the blameworthiness of harmful choices and modulates action
values in caudate and thalamus (4), two subcortical areas shown
to play a critical role in associative learning and pain processing
as well as moral decision making (41–46).
On the other hand, one principal function of model-free
learning is to cache value in actions that are reliably adaptive,
sacrificing flexibility for efficiency. Given that harming others is
typically prohibited, actions that harm others may represent a
special class of actions that are prioritized for model-free
learning, similar to how certain classes of stimuli, like snakes
and spiders, are “prepared” for aversive classical conditioning
(47). In other words, since avoiding harm to others is hugely
important for social life, learning processes that fast-track harm-
avoidant action selection to a habitual, automatic process may be
socially adaptive. Supporting this view, recent work suggests that
morality constrains mental representations of what actions are
considered possible; harmful actions are removed from choice
sets as a default (48), and choices that harm others are slower
than helpful choices, suggesting an automatic tendency to avoid
harm (5, 49–51). Furthermore, recent studies of model-free
learning to gain rewards for oneself and others have high-
lighted a distinct encoding of prediction errors concerning oth-
ers’ outcomes in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex
(sgACC) (52, 53), a region that has been implicated in social and
moral decision making more broadly (53–57). Model-free pro-
cesses that distinguish learning about how one’s actions affect
others could provide a neural mechanism for prioritizing model-
free learning in moral contexts.
To test these competing hypotheses, we used computational
modeling and functional MRI (fMRI) to probe the relative
balance between model-based vs. model-free processes, and their
neural bases, when people learn to avoid moderately painful
electric shocks for themselves and a stranger. Forty-one partic-
ipants attended a 3.5-h experimental session. After undergoing
an extensive pain thresholding procedure (Methods), they com-
pleted a hybrid version of two paradigms previously proposed to
reliably dissociate model-free vs. model-based learning (Fig. 1)
(20, 23, 32). We optimized the task in a way that allowed us to
address the specific hypotheses examined in the present study
(see SI Appendix, Supplementary Text for details) and included as
many as 272 trials per participant to accurately sample decisions
for both self and other. Our final analysis included 36 partici-
pants who made a total of 9,792 choices.
Results
Model-Free Decision Making Is Prioritized When Learning to Avoid
Harming Others vs. Self. Participants completed a two-step
decision-making task to index model-free and model-based
learning strategies (Fig. 1). Prior to scanning, participants were
trained on the transition structure of the task using stimuli dif-
ferent from the main experiment which allowed them to learn the
probabilistic transition structure. The two-step task distinguishes
model-free and model-based learning by measuring people’s
choices to stay or switch based on the outcome (in this case pain or
no pain) of the previous trial and the transition structure of the
task (whether the trial was “common” or “rare”). On common
trials (70%) participants’ choice at the first stage always leads to
the same second-stage environment. On rare trials (30%), par-
ticipants’ first-stage choice unexpectedly leads them to the oppo-
site environment. Theoretically, a purely model-free learner would
ignore the transition structure and repeat first-stage choices if they
prevented pain on the previous trial but switch choices if the
previous choice caused pain. Thus, model-free learning is reflected
in a main effect of outcome (pain vs. no pain) on subsequent first-
stage choice behavior. Participants switch after pain and stay after
no pain. In contrast, a model-based learner would take the tran-
sition structure into account. While behavior on common transi-
tions would be the same as for a model-free agent, after rare
transitions a model-based agent would repeat a first-stage choice if
the outcome was pain but switch if the outcome was no pain. Thus,
model-based learning is reflected in an interaction between out-
come (pain vs. no pain) and transition (common vs. rare). It is now
well established that people display a combination of model-free
and model-based behaviors when learning about rewarding out-
comes (20, 32, 58), and initial evidence indicates that the same is
true for learning about aversive (painful) outcomes for oneself (59,
60). We therefore first examined whether participants displayed a
combination of model-free and model-based processes during
aversive learning for oneself and others, as observed in these
previous studies of reward learning. We conducted a series of
model-agnostic and model-derived analyses where we sought to
reproduce the same behavioral effect across different analytic
approaches.
To parallel previous work on model-free and model-based
behavior (20), we began our analyses by using a logistic regres-
sion to assess model-free and model-based behavior and inter-
actions with recipient, before showing that these results were
robust to including random effects. We predicted first-stage stay
vs. switch choices as a function of the outcome (pain or no pain),
transition on the previous trial (common or rare), and recipient
(self vs. other). Specifically, we built a model that tested whether
people showed model-free behavior, model-based behavior, and
an effect of recipient either interacting with the model-free and/
or the model-based component. We found a significant main ef-
fect of outcome [t(35) = 4.618, P < 0.001, CI for beta estimate: 0.17,
0.42, Cohen’s d = 0.77] indicating a contribution of model-free
learning but also a significant transition by outcome interaction
[t(35) = −3.173, P = 0.003, CI for beta estimate: −0.23, −0.05,
d = −0.53], indicating the presence of model-based learning
(Fig. 2 A and B). These findings demonstrate that, similar to reward
learning, aversive learning is underpinned by a mixture of model-
based and model-free processes, regardless of whether outcomes
are for oneself or another person.
Despite evidence of both model-free and model-based learn-
ing strategies, it could be the case that one strategy is particularly
prioritized when learning to avoid harm to self or other. To test
this, we examined interactions between shock recipient and the
model-free and model-based components of learning. We found
a significant interaction between outcome (the model-free contri-
bution to learning) and recipient, showing that people were more
model-free for others relative to self [t(35) = −2.31, P = 0.027, CI of
beta estimates −0.12, −0.008, d = −0.39]. Importantly, there was no
interaction between transition × outcome (the model-based com-
ponent of learning) and recipient [t(35) = −0.459, P > 0.64, CI of
beta estimates: −0.071, 0.045, d = −0.08, BF01 = 5.1, providing
substantial evidence in support of the null].
Because model-based behavior may in some cases be more
effortful but does not achieve better outcomes in this version of
the task, it is possible that a model-based learner might learn to
become more model-free over the course of the task. We
therefore also assessed whether our estimate of being model-free
interacted with trial number. However, no significant association
was observed [t(35) = −0.88, P = 0.39, CI for beta estimate: −0.11






































0.05, BF01 = 3.9, providing substantial evidence in support of the
null]. For additional robustness, we also assessed whether our
effect of being more model-free for other changed over the course
of the experiment. Again the interaction of outcome, recipient,
and trial number was not significant [t(35) = −0.05, P = 0.74 CI for
beta estimate: −0.05 0.07, BF01 = 5.3, providing substantial evi-
dence in support of the null], speaking against the possibility that
participants learned to become more model-free for others but
not self across the experiment.
We next validated these behavioral results by repeating our
analysis using linear-mixed effects models with the lme4 package in
R, which ensured we had good estimates of random effects and
accounted for variability in behavior using Bound Optimization by
Quadratic Approximation (Methods). We included all main effects
and interactions, and random slopes, and found all results remained
the same (SI Appendix, Supplementary Text). Taken together, these
findings support the idea that people were more model-free when
avoiding harming others but not less model-based.
Fig. 1. Model-free and model-based aversive learning task. Participants completed a two-stage decision-making task to assess the tendency to engage in
model-free and model-based learning. The task was a hybrid of two tasks previously shown to assess model-free and model-based learning processes (20, 27).
We used this task to probe learning to avoid aversive (shock) outcomes for either oneself or another person (the “receiver,” referred to as “other” hereafter).
At the beginning of each block, an instruction cue signaled the recipient of the outcome (self or other). At the first stage, two images were displayed that
probabilistically led to one of two states (common [∼70% of the time] or uncommon [rare] transition [∼30% of the time]), depicted by different colors
surrounding the boxes. In this example, to “blue zone” or “yellow zone” for the other participant and “turquoise zone” or “purple zone” for self. Partic-
ipants then made a second choice between two pictures in the colored zone which was followed by an outcome of shock or no shock. The probability with
which the boxes at the second stage delivered a shock or no-shock outcome drifted throughout the experiment (bounded between 0 and 1 with a drift rate of
0.2) and participants were instructed to keep learning throughout. Ten percent of the total electric shocks accumulated in the “self” condition were delivered
to the participant themselves at the end of the experiment, while 10% of the electric shocks accumulated in the “other” condition were delivered to the
partner participant.





























































To further examine which outcomes most influenced the
outcome × recipient interaction, we performed separate post hoc
tests on the percentage of stay/switch choices for self and other
following: 1) only pain outcomes and 2) only no-pain outcomes.
This showed that the recipient difference was driven by increased
switching after pain outcomes for other vs. self (P = 0.028,
Cohen’s d = 0.38, 95% CI = [0.041, 0.72]), with no statistically
significant difference between recipients in the proportion of
stay/switch choices after no pain outcomes (P = 0.552, d = 0.10,
95% CI = [−0.23, 0.43], BF01 = 4.72 providing substantial evi-
dence in support of the null). This is important because the
specificity of the effect rules out that people were simply more
indifferent or inattentive to the outcomes of others compared
to self.
Finally, to confirm that our findings were consistent with a
harm-aversion account rather than an effort or inattention ac-
count, we examined reaction times in the self and other condi-
tions, with the idea that differences in reaction times might index
greater inattention or cognitive effort for self vs. other trials.
There was no difference in reaction times (RTs) overall when
deciding for self compared to other [F(1,35) = 0.17, P = 0.69,
η2 = 0.05, BF01 = 6.87, substantial evidence in support of the
null], although as expected participants were slower to make
decisions to switch relative to stay in general [F(1,35) = 11.73,
P = 0.002, η2 = 0.25].
To summarize, choice data provided clear evidence for more
pronounced model-free behavior for other compared to self and
were not consistent with merely showing less model-based or
more random behavior. This is because participants specifically
switched more after causing harmful outcomes to others, inde-
pendent of transition type, and there were no recipient differ-
ences in RT latencies.
Computational Modeling of Aversive Learning for Self and Other.
Next, we fitted several trial-by-trial computational models to
our data to examine further which model best captured the de-
scribed behaviors during aversive learning for self and other.
Deriving such trial-by-trial estimates that capture individual
choice preferences was a prerequisite for modeling the fMRI
data and allowed us to support our logistic regression analyses.
We started with the full seven-parameter model proposed by
Daw et al. (20) and compared this model to similar models with
fewer parameters (four or five) following modifications similar to
those suggested in previous studies (e.g., refs. 61 and 62; for
details, see Methods and SI Appendix, Table S2 and Supplemen-
tary Text). We also included variants of the same models that
involved separate learning rates for pain and no-pain outcomes,
given evidence suggesting differential learning as a function of
outcome valence (e.g. refs. 63 and 64). All of these models were
initially fitted separately on self and other blocks.
We found that a five-parameter model best explained behavior
compared to all alternative models tested. This model included
separate learning rates for no pain and pain outcomes (αPain,
αNoPain), a single temperature parameter capturing choice
randomness (β), a perseverance parameter capturing a tendency
to stick with the previously made choice (ρ), and a model-free/
model-based weighting parameter (ω). Importantly, this five-
parameter model best explained behavior in both the self and
other blocks (SI Appendix, Table S1).
We next compared the different estimated parameters for the
self and other blocks. This analysis showed a significant differ-
ence between the conditions in both the perseverance parameter
ρ (t(35) = 2.41, P = 0.02, d = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.74]) and the
model-free/based weighting parameter ω (t(35) = 3.10, P =
0.0039, d = 0.51, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.86]; SI Appendix, Table S2).
To compare these parameters more robustly, we then used
maximum a posteriori estimation performed on the pooled data
Fig. 2. Model-free and model-based choices when avoiding harming oneself and others. (A) Logistic regression coefficients predicting first-level stay/switch
choices (mean ± SEM). Participants exhibited a main effect of staying after no pain, which indicated model-free behavior [t(35) = 4.618, P < 0.001, CI for beta
estimate: 0.17, 0.42, Cohen’s d = 0.77] and a outcome × transition interaction, which indicated model-based behavior [t(35) = −3.173, P = 0.003, CI for beta
estimate: −0.23, −0.05, d = −0.53]. Intriguingly there was also an outcome × recipient interaction [t(35) = −2.31, P = 0.027, CI of beta estimates −0.12, −0.008,
d = −0.39] showing that participants were more model-free, and thus more likely to switch after pain and stay after no pain, independent of transition type,
when making choices for another person. (B). The probability of repeating a choice at the first level (“stay”) is plotted as a function of the transition and
outcome on the previous trial. This shows that the outcome × recipient interaction in A is mostly driven by fewer stay trials after pain, regardless of transition
(two rightmost blue vs. orange bars). Thus, the more pronounced model free behavior for others is mostly driven by a lower probability of staying after pain
outcomes rather than a higher probability of staying after no pain outcomes). (C) ω estimates from the best-fitting model showed that the ω parameter was
significantly lower for other (0.45) than self (0.55), consistent with the regression analyses that showed people were more model-free when avoiding harm to
others compared to self (P < 0.02). Asterisks indicate significant difference at P < 0.05.






































of self and other blocks to compare three models, one with
separate perseverance ρ and ω parameters for self and other
(and thus a total of seven parameters), one with separate ω pa-
rameters for self and other (and therefore a total of six param-
eters), and the original five-parameter model (which assumes the
same ρ and ω across self and other blocks). We used these
models to examine whether differences in the ρ and ω parame-
ters between self and other when fitted separately reflected true
differences in the weighting of these parameters in a model
comparison. This analysis showed that the model with separate
ω’s for self and other, but not separate ρ’s, best explained the
data. Importantly, these ω parameters were also significantly
different from one another (selfω = 0.55, otherω = 0.45, t(35) =
2.41, P = 0.02, d = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.74]; Fig. 2C and SI
Appendix, Tables S3 and S4). Thus, consistent with the
regression-based behavioral analyses that did not rely on a
computational model (Fig. 2A), participants were more model-
free than model-based when learning to avoid harming others,
compared to self (Fig. 2C). See Methods and SI Appendix, Sup-
plementary Text for further details.
Finally, we ran several control analyses. First, we tested
whether any participants might be actively trying to harm the
other person by allowing the beta parameter to take on negative
values (although we note that a negative beta might also reflect
poorer learning rather than willingness to inflict pain on others).
This analysis showed no participant was given a negative beta
weight. Second, recent evidence suggests that model-free be-
havior might reflect the use of different or nonstandard models
and can reflect poorer model fits (65). We therefore also
assessed whether there were differences in model fits between
the self and other conditions. We compared the negative log-
likelihood, which is the sum of the logarithm of the choice
probabilities and the measure of the fitting error that is mini-
mized during fitting. Comparison of the individual negative log-
likelihoods for self vs. other was not significant [t(35) = 0.18, P =
0.86; BF01 = 5.5, substantial evidence for the null].
Next, we confirmed that participants were not incentivized to
employ a more model-free or model-based strategy. We ran a
simulation of purely model-free (ω = 0) and purely model-based
(ω = 1) agents. Comparing the total shocks accumulated for
these two types of agents showed no significant difference
[t(198) = 0.45, P = 0.649)] and Bayesian analysis showed sub-
stantial evidence in support of the null (BF01 = 5.90). We then
compared the total shocks accumulated in the self and other
conditions from our participants and again showed no significant
difference [t(35) = −0.211, P = 0.834)] with Bayesian analyses
providing substantial evidence for no difference (BF01 = 5.47).
Together, these analyses confirm that our results were not
related to differences in model fits, there were no participants
who were trying to actively harm others, and that, as we inten-
ded, our modified two-step task did not incentivize a model-free
or model-based strategy (see also SI Appendix, Experimental Note
in Introduction).
Subcortical Areas Distinguish Model-Free Prediction Errors for Self
and Other. Previous neuroimaging studies of model-based and
model-free reward learning have reported model-free prediction
error signals in ventral striatum (20). We therefore first sought to
replicate this effect in our aversive learning paradigm. To facil-
itate comparison with previous studies of reward learning, no-
pain outcomes were coded as 1 and pain outcomes coded as 0.
Therefore, a positive prediction error represents unexpected
pain relief/avoidance, and a negative prediction error represents
unexpected pain.
We built a general linear model (GLM1) that contained onsets
for the first-stage choice, second-stage choice, and outcome
separately for self and other trials. These three time periods were
each associated with parametric modulators from our winning
model. These included the value difference between the two
options at the first-stage choice, the state prediction error based
on the transition at the second-stage choice, and the model-free
prediction error at the time of the outcome. We focused our
analysis on model-free prediction errors at the time of the out-
come for two reasons. First, our behavioral effects showed that
self/other differences in learning emerged for model-free but not
model-based learning. Second, model-free and model-based
prediction errors are highly correlated and careful examination
of their separate influences has shown that they are both enco-
ded in ventral striatum (20). Significant activations are overlaid
on anatomical images using the MRIcron software for Figs. 3–5.
Following standard procedures for multiple comparisons cor-
rection in fMRI, main effects are reported at P < 0.05, family-
wise error (FWE) cluster-corrected across the whole brain after
initial thresholding at P < 0.001, or P < 0.05 FWE small volume-
corrected (SVC) after initial thresholding at P < 0.001 for a
priori regions of interest (ROIs) (66, 67).
We began our analyses by examining whether previously
reported neural correlates of value difference and state predic-
tion errors were also observed in our paradigm. Several areas
tracked inverse value difference and thus showed larger re-
sponses for choices that had a smaller value difference between
the two first-stage options, including the most dorsal parts of
anterior cingulate cortex near pre-supplementary motor area,
bilateral inferior parietal cortex, and middle frontal gyrus (SI
Appendix, Table S5), regions previously associated with the
tracking of inverse subjective value difference (69–71). These
signals did not differ between self and other (SI Appendix, Table
S5). Also consistent with previous findings (22), we found evi-
dence of a main effect for state prediction errors at the second
stage in dorsal ACC (x = −6, y = 10, z = 52, Z = 4.85, K = 906,
P < 0.001 FWE-corrected) that again showed overlap between
self and other (SI Appendix, Table S5).
Next, we tested whether model-free prediction errors were
present in ventral striatum, as reported in a previous study ex-
amining model-based and model-free reward learning for self
(20) and several studies of reward-based reinforcement learning
Fig. 3. (A and B) Ventral striatum (VS) encodes prediction errors (PE) of pain
avoidance for self and other. Ventral striatum (right x = 10, y = 12, z = −4,
k = 236, z = 5.84; left x = −16, y = 6, z = −10, k = 458, z = 5.77, P < 0.05 FWE
whole brain-corrected after initial thresholding at P < 0.001) tracked model-
free prediction errors for both self and other bilaterally, with no significant
differences between conditions.





























































(72). We found a large bilateral cluster signaling prediction er-
rors of harm avoidance (positive for no pain, negative for pain)
in ventral striatum (right x = 10, y = 12, z = −4, k = 236, Z =
5.84; left x = −16, y = 6, z = −10, k = 458, z = 5.77, P < 0.05 FWE
whole brain-corrected after initial thresholding at P < 0.001;
Fig. 3). Again, this signal did not significantly differ for self and
other conditions [right t(34) = −0.14, P = 0.89, BF01 = 5.4,
providing substantial evidence in support of the null; left
t(34) = −1.47, P = 0.152, BF01 = 4.0, providing substantial evi-
dence in support of the null].
Given that our behavioral results indicated that model-free
decision making was prioritized when learning to avoid harm
to others (relative to self), we next sought to identify areas that
distinguished model-free prediction errors for others (relative to
self). Importantly, our paradigm was designed to specifically
assess how people learn to avoid harming self and other, rather
than how they benefit self and other by collecting rewards, as in
previous studies (20). We therefore focused our analyses on
areas of the brain that have previously been linked to pain
processing and aversive learning, as well as those involved in
learning in general and social decision making (Methods).
This analysis revealed a cluster in the thalamus extending into the
caudate [x = 16, y = −18, z =0, k = 84, P = 0.033, Z = 3.50 FWE-
SVC from an independent anatomical mask of the thalamus and
x = 12, y = −2, z = 4, Z = 4.08, k = 125, P = 0.005 FWE-SVC after
initial thresholding at P < 0.001 for a functional ROI derived from
Neurosynth to the term “pain” and x = 10, y = −4, z = 4, Z = 3.83,
k = 54, and P = 0.002 FWE-SVC for an 8-mm sphere from a meta-
analysis of observed pain (68); Fig. 4 A and B and SI Appendix, Fig.
S1]. The cluster positively tracked prediction errors of pain avoid-
ance when learning for other (t(33) = 2.30, P = 0.028, Cohen’s d =
0.39, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.74]) and negatively tracked prediction errors
of pain avoidance when learning for self (t(33) = −2.89, P = 0.007,
Cohen’s d = −0.50, 95% CI = [−0.85, −0.14]). Although this cluster
extended into the caudate, the caudate ROI itself was not signifi-
cant (x = 18, y = 6, z = 0, Z = 3.49, k = 2, P = 0.064, FWE-SVC
after initial thresholding at P < 0.001) (see SI Appendix, Table S6
and Supplementary Text for additional Bayesian first-level analyses
comparing prediction error and outcome only models of neural
response).
Signals Consistent with Model-Free Influence Are Encoded in sgACC.
One signature of model-free learning is a tendency to repeat
previously rewarded actions and avoid previously punished ac-
tions, regardless of experienced transitions (20). Such a model-
free influence is thought to emerge at the time of choice by ac-
tivating the reinforcement histories of potential actions and
driving selection of the most valuable action in terms of its recent
history (73). In the context of our task, through model-free in-
fluence, an action that was unpunished on the previous trial
should be prioritized for selection (“stay”), while an action that
was punished on the previous trial should be avoided (“switch”).
Importantly, because model-free learning is insensitive to task
structure, this process should occur regardless of whether the
transition from the first to the second stage experienced on the
previous trial was common or rare.
Therefore, to probe the neural signatures consistent with a
model-free influence at the time of choice, and any potential
differences between self and other conditions, we examined
neural responses during “switch” and “stay” choices at the first
stage as a function of the outcome on the previous trial (no pain
or pain). We created an additional GLM (GLM2) that modeled
the onset of self trials after pain, self trials after no pain, other
trials after pain, and other trials after no pain, with stay (−1) and
switch (1) coded as parametric modulators of each of these on-
sets. Thus, our analysis examined differential neural encoding of
stay vs. switch decisions on the current trial, as a function of the
outcome on the previous trial (pain or no pain) and its recipient
(self or other).
Our analysis revealed a signal in sgACC consistent with a
model-free influence on “other” trials (x = −2, y = 36, z = 6, K =
498; Z = 3.88, P = 0.028, FWE whole brain-corrected). This
region was more active during stay relative to switch choices on
the current trial, following a “no pain” outcome on the previous
trial, selectively in the “other” condition (Fig. 5A). Corroborat-
ing the view that this signal reflects a model-free influence, re-
sponses in sgACC were positively associated with the model-
free × recipient interaction in behavior (r(31) = 0.36, P =
0.039, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.62]; Fig. 5B) such that participants with
the largest sgACC difference between stay and switch following
no pain for other also showed the strongest prioritization of
model-free learning for others relative to self (for results relating
to our TPJ ROI, see SI Appendix, Fig. S2 and Supplementary
Text). To provide further evidence that this signal was consistent
with model-free processing, we conducted an additional confir-
matory analysis (GLM3) where we modeled onsets separately for
stay vs. switch choices with two parametric regressors—a model-
free (outcome [no pain/pain]) and a model-based (outcome ×
transition [no pain/pain × common/rare transition]) regressor
Fig. 4. Thalamus/caudate signal distinguishes model-free prediction errors
for avoiding harm to other vs. self. (A) Thalamus cluster from the contrast
other prediction error > self prediction error (x = 16, y = −18, z = 0, k = 84,
P = 0.033, Z = 3.50 FWE-SVC from an independent anatomical mask of the
thalamus and x = 12 y = −2 z = 4, Z = 4.08, k = 125, P = 0.005 FWE-SVC after
initial thresholding at P < 0.001 for a functional ROI derived from Neuro-
synth to the term “pain” and x = 10 y = −4 z = 4, Z = 3.83, k = 54, and P =
0.002 FWE-SVC for an 8-mm sphere from a meta-analysis of observed pain
(68) overlaid on an anatomical scan to show the extent of activation. (B) For
illustration, parameter estimates extracted from the thalamus cluster are
shown separately for self and other prediction error (PE). See SI Appendix,
Fig. S1 for a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies with the term “pain”
that highlights overlapping activation in the thalamus.






































that competed for variance (correlations were all <0.4). This
analysis showed overlapping voxels in sgACC compared to those
identified in GLM2 that tracked the model-free but not the
model-based regressor (SI Appendix, Fig. S3 and Supplementary
Text). Finally, we confirmed using bootstrapping that the effect
seen in sgACC after rare transitions was comparable to the effect
observed after common transitions (SI Appendix, Fig. S4).
Increased Functional Connectivity between sgACC and Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex When Switching after No Pain for Other. Behav-
ioral analyses indicated that participants on average showed a
mixture of model-based and model-free strategies but prioritized
model-free decision making when avoiding harm to others. Thus,
we next sought to identify regions that might modulate the
model-free effects observed specifically in the “other” condition
in sgACC (Fig. 5A). We therefore conducted psychophysiologi-
cal interaction (PPI) analyses (GLM4) to assess functional con-
nectivity between sgACC and the whole brain as a consequence
of staying vs. switching after no pain for other (see Methods for
additional details of analyses). This analysis revealed that func-
tional connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC) was significantly different during switch vs. stay
decisions following no pain for other (x = −46, y = 38, z = 26, k =
382, Z = 4.12, P = 0.039, FWE whole brain-corrected after initial
thresholding at P < 0.001).
Because the PPI was performed on the difference between stay
and switch trials, it did not give us insight into the sgACC–dlPFC
coupling separately for stay and switch. Therefore, to further un-
derstand the nature of this effect we plotted the average slope of
sgACC and dlPFC connectivity during stay and switch choices
following no pain for other (Fig. 5C). This showed that there was
positive coupling between sgACC and dlPFC for both stay and
switch trials, with stronger positive coupling during switch choices
compared to stay choices after receiving no pain for another person
(Fig. 5C). We did not observe significant differential coupling be-
tween sgACC and dlPFC during switch compared to stay choices
following no pain for self (GLM5; t(32) = 0.43, P = 0.667, d =0.08,
95% CI = [−0.27 0.42]; BF01 = 4.92 providing substantial evidence
in support of the null; Fig. 5C). See SI Appendix, Supplementary
Text for two additional GLMs (GLM 4.1 and 4.2) testing the profile
of dlPFC response.
Individual Differences in Moral Judgment Relate to Model-Free Moral
Learning. Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to examine
whether individual differences in moral judgment were related to
individual differences in model-free moral learning and its neu-
ral basis. Theoretical work has suggested that model-free pro-
cesses might explain tendencies to reject instrumentally harming
others, even when instrumental harm results in better outcomes
overall (3, 28). To test this, we measured individual differences in
endorsement of instrumental harm using the instrumental harm
component of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (74), which
measures agreement with statements like “It is morally right to
harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to
helping several other innocent people” and “Sometimes it is
morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral
damage—if more people are saved overall.” Consistent with
theoretical predictions, we found a significant positive relation-
ship between rejection of instrumental harm and model-free
learning for others, such that those people who most strongly
rejected instrumental harm were the most model-free when
avoiding harm to others (r(34) = 0.37, P = 0.026, 95% CI = [0.05,
0.62]; SI Appendix, Fig. S5). Furthermore, consistent with past
work linking endorsement of instrumental harm with dlPFC
function (75, 76), we found that endorsement of instrumental
harm was positively correlated with dLPFC–sgACC connectivity
when switching choices after causing harm to others (r(31) =
0.43, P = 0.012, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.68]; SI Appendix, Fig. S5).
Second, we probed the sensitivity of moral wrongness judg-
ments to how much suffering an action inflicts on a victim
(“outcome sensitivity”) vs. how aversive it feels to perform the
action [“action sensitivity” (77)]. Past work has connected the
former with model-based learning and the latter with model-free
learning (3, 28). However, we note that model-free learning is
directly sensitive to recent outcomes (18), which might lead to an
association between model-free behavior and outcome sensitivity.
Fig. 5. sgACC tracks stay vs. switch after no pain for other and connects more strongly to dlPFC when switching after no pain for other. (A) sgACC response
(x = −2, y = 36, z = 6, K = 498, P = 0.028, FWE whole brain-corrected, after initial thresholding at P < 0.001) to stay vs. switch after no pain for other overlaid on
the medial surface of an anatomical scan. The observed BOLD pattern is consistent with model-free behavior (B). Bivariate association between parameter
estimates for stay vs. switch after no pain for other in sgACC and greater model-free behavior for other (more negative on xmeans relatively more model-free
for other compared to self). (C) sgACC cluster connects to dlPFC (x = −46, y = 38, z = 26, k = 382, Z = 4.12, P = 0.039, FWE whole brain-corrected after initial
thresholding at P < 0.001) during decisions to switch relative to stay after no pain for other. Average slope estimates across participants show stronger
connectivity during switch decisions than stay decisions after receiving no pain for other (blue bars) but no difference in sgACC–dlPFC connectivity between
stay and switch for self [t(32) = 0.43, P = 0.667, d = 0.08, 95% CI for Cohen’s d = −0.27 0.42; BF01 = 4.92 providing substantial evidence in support of the null]
(orange bars). n.s, not statistically significant.





























































Participants evaluated the moral wrongness of 23 harmful actions
that varied independently in how much suffering they would cause
vs. how aversive they would feel to perform. Action sensitivity and
outcome sensitivity were inversely correlated (r(34) = −0.40, P =
0.016, 95% CI = [−0.08, −0.64]). Partial correlations controlling
for action sensitivity revealed that outcome sensitivity was posi-
tively correlated with several aspects of model-free moral learning
(SI Appendix, Fig. S6), including the tendency to switch following
harm to others (r(33) = −0.37, P = 0.029, 95% CI = [−0.04, −0.62]),
the strength of model-free prediction error signals for other vs. self in
thalamus/caudate (r(31) = 0.385, P = 0.027, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.64]),
and the strength of model-free influence in sgACC (r(30) = −0.374,
P = 0.035, 95% CI = [−0.04, −0.64]).
The reverse partial correlations testing for the effect of action
sensitivity while controlling for outcome sensitivity were not
significant (all P’s > 0.08, all |r’s| < −0.30). Together these
findings suggest that a natural tendency to engage in model-free
moral learning when avoiding harm to others is related to how
moral judgments of others’ harmful actions track with harm se-
verity (see SI Appendix, Supplementary Text for correlations with
the ω parameter).
Discussion
Learning to avoid actions that harm other people is a funda-
mental prerequisite for moral behavior. Here we show that
people prioritize model-free decision making when learning
which actions have the potential to harm others and that learning
to avoid harming others (vs. self) has a distinct neural signature.
The thalamus/caudate differentially encoded prediction errors of
pain avoidance for self vs. other, while sgACC positively tracked
with model-free influence on pain avoidance at the time of
choice. Overriding model-free influence when choices affected
others invoked stronger connectivity between sgACC and dlPFC.
Finally, multiple aspects of moral judgment were associated with
model-free moral learning and its neural correlates.
In the context of our study, model-free moral learning man-
ifested as a reduced likelihood of repeating actions that harmed
others on the previous trial, regardless of whether such actions
typically led to states with a high likelihood of harmful outcomes.
Our behavioral finding that people were more model-free when
learning to avoid harming others relative to themselves suggests
that potentially harmful actions might be prioritized for auto-
matic avoidance as a default. Given the importance of avoiding
harm to others for social life, such a learning mechanism would
be socially adaptive. Our findings are consistent with prior work
showing that morality constrains mental representations of what
actions are considered possible, with harmful actions removed
from choice sets as a default stance (48). Repeatedly assigning
negative action values to harmful actions over the course of one’s
life might automatically remove such actions from consideration,
even though in some cases locally harmful actions can lead to
wider benefits (e.g., a surgeon cutting open a patient to remove a
cancerous tumor). If such a learning strategy is socially adaptive,
this raises interesting questions about whether model-free learning
can be considered an “optimal” strategy in the ecological sense.
An alternative explanation for our behavioral findings is that
model-based learning is effortful (27), and people choose to put
in less effort to benefit others (78). Relatedly, after harming
another person this might cause someone to become more dis-
tracted or more uncertain about the impact of the outcome,
leading behavior to appear more model-free. With regards to the
effort account, such an explanation seems unlikely given that
model-free moral learning in our study was specifically driven by
a lower probability of repeating choices that harmed others,
while there was no difference between self and other on trials
that avoided harm. For further discussion of the effort account,
see SI Appendix, Supplementary Discussion. Finally, our results
are also not likely to be attributable to differences in the
subjective perception of the harmfulness or aversiveness of the
outcomes for others compared to self, as participants overall
rated shocks received for others in the task as being just as
aversive as shocks received for themselves, and differences in
shock aversiveness did not correlate with model-free behavior.
Taken together these results suggest that people might naturally
prioritize model-free decision making when learning to avoid
harming others, and these effects are unlikely to be explained by
less effort or engagement. However, these arguments do not
completely rule out alternative explanations and future studies
could use optimized designs to manipulate cognitive effort or
social uncertainty to test how these influence model-free learning.
Recent work has suggested that apparently model-free be-
havior in the two-step task might reflect the use of a different
model, rather than necessarily being model-free (65). We did not
observe any difference in model fits between the self and other
conditions, suggesting our observation of apparently greater
model-free learning for other than self does not simply reflect a
poorer model fit for other. However, our data show that par-
ticipants were particularly sensitive to whether the outcomes
were pain or no pain for other, which might be explained by
having a slightly more complex model than being purely model-
free in the strict sense.
Turning to the neural findings, we observed a signal in the
thalamus, extending to the caudate, that differentially encoded
model-free prediction errors when learning to avoid harming
others vs. self. These subcortical regions were previously ob-
served to encode value during moral decisions to avoid profiting
from others’ pain (4) and play a critical role in associative
learning and moral decision making more broadly (41, 43, 45,
46). The thalamus is often linked to the processing of the af-
fective dimension of pain in addition to its sensory properties
(79). For example, microstimulation of the thalamus can invoke
affective memories of previously experienced pain (46). The
thalamus/caudate signal differed from the adjacent ventral
striatum response that positively tracked model-free prediction
errors regardless of the recipient of the outcome, consistent with
a previous study using a similar task with rewarding outcomes for
self only (20). These findings suggest that multiple subcortical areas
support model-free moral learning, perhaps with ventral striatum
providing a generic model-free prediction error signal that is in-
sensitive to outcome valence and outcome recipient, and thalamus/
caudate providing additional information about social context.
Another signature consistent with model-free influence was
observed in sgACC at the time of choice, contingent on the
outcome of the previous trial and specific to the “other” condi-
tion. Specifically, signal in sgACC was higher when participants
repeated actions that previously avoided harming others, but not
during similar choices for oneself. Individual differences in
model-free behavior also tracked with individual differences in
sgACC response at the time of choice. Notably, previous work
has implicated sgACC in model-free learning to gain rewards for
others but not self (52) and in receiving unexpected positive
feedback from others (80), suggesting this region might compute
learning signals that are specific to social settings (81). More
broadly, activity in sgACC has been positively associated with
prosocial and moral behaviors (15, 53, 54, 56).
Collectively these findings suggest that sgACC might bias de-
cision making away from choices that could harm others. In
contrast, we found that when participants made a decision to
switch their choice after causing harm to others, there was in-
creased functional connectivity between sgACC and dlPFC.
These two regions showed stronger coupling on trials where
participants abandoned a choice that previously avoided pain for
others, compared with trials where participants repeated actions
that previously spared others from pain. Although we cannot
confidently attribute these patterns to model-based control, past
work has implicated dlPFC in model-based learning and decision






































making (32, 73). In parallel, research has linked these regions to
the adjustment of moral decisions to blame and punishment (5,
33, 34, 40, 82).
Finally, we observed correspondences between model-free
learning, its neural substrates, and moral judgments. Theoreti-
cal work has proposed links between model-based/model-free
learning and moral judgment (3, 28, 29, 83), but empirical sup-
port for such links has been scarce. We probed two aspects of
moral judgment. First, we examined individual differences in the
endorsement of instrumentally harming one person to save many
others—a key component of utilitarian ethical theories. Consis-
tent with our predictions, as well as work highlighting a link
between dlPFC activity and utilitarian judgments (76), we found
a positive relationship between endorsement of instrumental
harm and dlPFC–sgACC connectivity when switching choices
after causing harm to others. We also observed that those who
most strongly rejected instrumental harm were the most model-
free when learning to avoid harming others.
Second, we used a task that asked participants to judge how
morally wrong it would be to perform a series of violent actions
that varied independently in terms of how much suffering they
would inflict (“outcome sensitivity”) vs. how aversive they felt to
perform (“action sensitivity”) (77). We found that individual
variability in both the behavioral and neural signatures of model-
free learning were specifically correlated with outcome sensitiv-
ity, but not action sensitivity. Those people whose moral
wrongness judgments were more sensitive to the severity of
harmful outcomes were less likely to repeat decisions that
harmed others and showed stronger model-free prediction error
signals in the thalamus and caudate and stronger responses in
sgACC when repeating decisions that previously avoided harm-
ing others. Model-free learning has previously been suggested to
explain why actions that typically harm others feel aversive to
perform, even when they are not actually harmful (3, 28). Thus,
one might expect that a greater tendency to engage in model-free
moral learning should predict action sensitivity in moral judg-
ments, rather than outcome sensitivity. However, model-free
learning is directly sensitive to recent outcomes (18) and in the
context of our task manifested as a tendency for choices to be
immediately sensitive to harmful outcomes for others. Thus,
individual differences in sensitivity to others’ harm could be
commonly associated with model-free moral learning and out-
come sensitivity in moral judgments. Overall, these findings
provide exploratory evidence linking model-free learning to in-
dividual differences in moral judgments, effects that should be
tested more extensively in larger samples. In particular, it would
be worthwhile to probe how model-free learning relates to util-
itarian and deontological moral judgments using measures that
can dissociate the two (84–86).
More broadly, our findings highlight differences in the neu-
rocognitive mechanisms engaged in learning to avoid harming
oneself vs. others that underscore the unique demands of social
decision making. One important feature of decisions that affect
others (as opposed to oneself) is that it is far more difficult to
build a model that incorporates others’ preferences and beliefs
than a model that captures only one’s own preferences. Fur-
thermore, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of such
models, given that the subjective experiences of others are fun-
damentally unknowable (87, 88). Utilitarian approaches to moral
decision making that involve maximizing well-being for all sen-
tient beings (89) may thus be computationally intractable for
the model-based system. Rule-based approaches, like those
enshrined in deontological theories of morality (90), circumvent
the need for complex model building and may be socially
adaptive even for simple social decisions like the ones studied
here. Regardless of whether such a strategy is adaptive, it re-
mains an open question whether it is normatively appropriate. In
addition, whether the prioritization of model-free learning
extends to other kinds of social decisions, such as acting to obtain
rewards for others, avoiding monetary losses, or, indeed, even
social decision making in nonhuman species, is an important
topic for future study.
Finally, there are some limitations to our study that should be
acknowledged. We specifically designed our study such that the
decider participants never met or had any information about the
receiver, in order to control for potential motivations of repu-
tation and reciprocity on the decider’s learning and decision
making. While this allowed us greater control over participants’
motivation for avoiding harming others, it does not allow us to
examine how social knowledge of others influences moral
learning. Because it may be more straightforward to build a
model that incorporates others’ preferences in situations where
those preferences are highly familiar, it could be that people
become more model-based for others in such situations, such as
choosing on behalf of a romantic partner or sibling, which could
be tested in future studies.
In order to compare the relative balance between model-based
and model-free strategies when learning for oneself vs. others, it
was necessary to use a variant of the two-step task that matched
success rates for the two strategies (see SI Appendix, Experi-
mental Note in Introduction). However, a limitation of this vari-
ant of the task is that a purely model-based learner could learn,
over the course of the task, that engaging in a model-based
strategy is not worth the effort, and thus come to masquerade
model-free behavior over time. This is unlikely to be a general
problem here, as we did not observe increases in model-free
behavior over time at the group level, nor was there a relation-
ship between model-basedness and the degree to which model-
free or model-based behaviors changed over time. Future studies
should investigate whether the findings reported here generalize
across different kinds of learning settings that impose different
costs and benefits on model-based and model-free learning.
Moreover, while the two-step task we employed allows the as-
sessment of model-free and model-based learning strategies, a
hybrid strategy of using both model-free and model based
strategies is the most common behavior demonstrated on the
task (e.g., refs. 20 and 32) and also what we observed here.
Overall, we observed that when learning to avoid harm to others
(vs. self), participants showed a stronger relative balance toward
model-free over model-based learning. Multiple model-free
learning signatures were apparent in behavior as well as cortical
and subcortical areas that distinctly process harm avoidance for
others compared to self. These findings could have important
implications for theories of learning and moral decision making as
well as disorders associated with impaired avoidance learning and
social cognition.
Methods
Participants. All participants gave written informed consent and the study was
approved by the University of Oxford Medical Sciences Division Ethics Com-
mittee. Forty-one right-handed, healthy adults were recruited through uni-
versity participant databases. Exclusion criteria included previous or current
neurological or psychiatric disorder, nonnormal or noncorrected-to-normal
vision, previous participation in studies involving social interactions and/or
electric shocks, and contraindications that prohibited MRI scanning. Partici-
pants were compensated at a rate of £15 per hour. All participants played the
role of the decider. One participant was excluded as they reported that they
did not believe their decisions would affect another person in the postscan-
ning debrief. Three participants were excluded because the logistic regression
analysis of their choice behavior did not converge. In two of these participants,
this was because they had less than 5% switch trials; in the third participant,
there was a very high correlation (>0.8) between the outcome and transition
(common vs. rare) regressors on switch trials. One participant was excluded
from the fMRI analysis due to distortions in the scan caused by metal artifacts
(braces) and another for excessive head motion (movement of greater than
1 mm in any direction in more than 10% of the total time series). This left a
final sample of 36 participants for behavioral analyses (16 female, 20 male, age
18 to 36 y) and 34 participants (16 female, 18 male, age 18 to 36 y) for the





























































parametric fMRI analyses. For the stay/switch analysis, one further participant
was excluded for having no variance in at least one regressor, making their
fMRI GLM inestimable. With 33 subjects we had 80% power to detect a
“medium” effect size of d = 0.50 at alpha = 0.05 (two-tailed), an effect size
smaller than typically reported in this field, indicating sufficient power.
Procedure. Participants attended a 3.5-h experimental session after under-
going substantial prescreening. We administered an extensive pain thresh-
olding procedure which was based on previous studies of self and other pain
processing (4, 5). The pain thresholding procedure allowed us to control for
heterogeneity of skin resistance between participants to ensure the deliv-
ered shocks would be rated at a matched subjective level of pain intensity
and also to provide participants with full experience of the shocks before the
learning task to ensure their choices were truly guided by knowledge of the
pain and no-pain outcomes. Participants were then assigned to roles of ei-
ther “decider” or “receiver” using a role assignment procedure that has
been used in several previous studies (see refs. 5 and 78). Briefly, participants
were instructed to wear colored rubber gloves to hide their identity. They
then stood either side of a door and waved to one another so that they
knew another person was there but could not discern any information about
the other participant’s age or gender. Next, a coin was flipped to decide who
would draw a ball out of a box first and then each participant drew a ball.
The experimental participant was then told that the color of their ball meant
they had been assigned to the role of decider. Before completing the task in
the scanner participants performed a practice task of one block that did not
specify whether outcomes were for self or other and they were told no
actual shocks would be received during the practice. This practice task, which
used stimuli not used in the experimental task, allowed participants to be-
come familiar with the transition structure of the task, that they were told
would remain the same in the main experiment. The main experiment
consisted of four blocks of 68 trials (136 trials for self and 136 trials for other)
and lasted ∼45 min. This resulted in an analysis of a total of 9,792 choices
across the 36 participants in our experiment.
Experimental Task.We adapted features from two variants of a task designed
to distinguish model-free and model-based learning (20, 27) (Fig. 1 and SI
Appendix, Experimental Note in Introduction). Participants were presented
with two fractal images that probabilistically led them to one of two
“states” where they were required to make a second choice that was fol-
lowed by a symbol indicating the receipt of pain or the receipt of no pain
(neutral). At the beginning of each block and on each trial, they were told
whether they were playing for themselves (“You”), meaning the painful
outcomes would be delivered to themselves, or for the other participant
(“Receiver”), indicating that the painful outcomes would be delivered to the
other participant. In order to match the self and other conditions in terms of
pain stimulation, no electric shocks were delivered during the scan. How-
ever, participants were told that 10% of the electric shocks that they ac-
quired during the task would be given to themselves at the end of the
session and 10% of the electric shocks they accumulated for the other par-
ticipant would be delivered to the other participant at the end of the
scanning session. In order to account for potential differences in pain per-
ception, participants were instructed that for “You” trials we would use the
voltage setting that corresponded to their level-8 rating, and for the “Re-
ceiver” trials we would use the voltage setting that corresponded to the
Receiver’s level-8 rating (full instructions can be downloaded at OSF: https://
osf.io/3stp9/files/). At the end of the scan, participants also rated how they
felt when obtaining a shock for themselves and the receiver during that task
on a 0 to 10 point scale from “very negative” (0) to “very positive” (10).
Participants perceived the shocks to be aversive for both self (mean = 3.38,
SD = 1.44) and other (mean = 3.30, SD = 1.61) [t(36) = 0.279, P = 0.782],
suggesting that the perception of harm was equivalent. The order with
which participants completed the self and other blocks was counterbalanced
across participants, as were the experimental stimuli that belonged to self
and other blocks, to control for possible confounds in liking of different
stimuli. Participants were instructed that the probability of reaching each of
the two “states” would remain fixed throughout the task but the proba-
bility that each stimulus would deliver pain or no pain would change
throughout the task so that they needed to keep on learning. See SI Ap-
pendix, Supplementary Text for further details.
Statistical Analysis of Behavioral Data. Analyses of behavioral data were
performed in R (version 1.1.423, for linear mixed-effects modeling, lme4,
version 1.1-21) and MATLAB 2015b (for logistic regression analyses on the
probability of stay and for computational modeling analyses employing hi-
erarchical fitting written with custom MATLAB code; see SI Appendix,
Supplementary Text for further details). For nonsignificant tests, to provide
evidence for the null, Bayesian statistics was performed in JASP (https://jasp-
stats.org) (91, 92). Default priors from the JASP program were used. The
strength of null effects was interpreted using the language suggested by
Jeffreys (93). All tests were two-tailed.
Moral Judgment Measures. Participants completed the Oxford Utilitarianism
Scale (74) and the Harmful Action Outcome scale (77) via an online link in the
preceding weeks before the scanning session. See SI Appendix, Supple-
mentary Text for further details.
Computational Modeling of Behavioral Data. For modeling of choice behavior
using trial-by-trial updates, we evaluated a number of plausible models
fitted either to self and other blocks separately or across self and other
blocks combined. Models were fitted using a hierarchical Bayesian model
fitting approach described in detail in refs. 94 and 95. It finds the maximum a
posteriori estimate of each parameter for each subject using a prior distribu-
tion for each parameter which helps to regularize and constrain parameters.
The algorithm uses expectation–maximization (96) and parameters were
transformed to a logistic or exponential distribution to enforce constraints and
ensure normality such that 0<{α,ω}<1, {β,λ}>0.
For formal model comparison, we report the Bayesian information cri-
terion (BIC) based on the log-likelihood and computed the model evidence
by integrating out the free parameters [BICint (94, 95); SI Appendix, Tables
S1 and S2]. Exceedance probabilities were calculated by feeding the BICint
into SPM’s function spm_BMS (https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm8/). The winning model was a six-parameter model with αPain, αNoPain,
β, and ρ shared but ω split into ωSelf and ωOther. See SI Appendix, Supple-
mentary Text for further details.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis. Multiband T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging
(EPI) volumes with blood oxygenation level–dependent (BOLD) contrast
were acquired using a Siemens Prisma 3T MRI scanner. The EPI volumes were
acquired in an ascending manner, at an oblique angle (∼30°) to the AC–PC
line to decrease the impact of susceptibility artifacts in the orbitofrontal
cortex. We used the following parameters. Voxel size 2 × 2 × 2, echo time =
30 ms; repetition time = 1,570 ms; flip angle = 90°; field of view = 216 mm.
The structural scan was acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid
gradient echo sequence with 192 slices; slice thickness = 1 mm; repetition
time = 1,900 ms; echo time = 3.97 ms; field of view = 192 mm × 192 mm;
voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1-mm resolution. fMRI data were analyzed using SPM12
(https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) using a standard preprocessing pipeline
(see SI Appendix, Figs. S7 and S8 and Supplementary Text for details and
setup of GLMs 1 through 5).
Contrast images from the first level were input into flexible-factorial designs.
Following standard procedures, main effects are reported at P < 0.05, FWE
cluster-corrected across the whole brain after initial thresholding at P < 0.001
or P < 0.05 FWE-SVC after initial thresholding at P < 0.001 for regions where
we had a strong a priori hypothesis (66, 67). These areas were defined ana-
tomically and included subcortical regions of the caudate and thalamus (taken
from the WFU PickAtlas Toolbox), bilateral posterior TPJ (from ref. 97), the
sgACC (areas s24 and 25 from ref. 98), and the dlPFC (areas 46v and 9 taken
from ref. 99). These ROIs were also used to confirm anatomical labeling. We
also performed a meta-analysis in Neurosynth for the term “pain” that in-
cluded studies of both observed and experienced pain. This meta-analysis ro-
bustly showed activation in the thalamus that overlapped both with the
cluster identified in the present study and with the findings of Crockett et al.
(4) showing that caudate and thalamus activity reflect the modulation of ac-
tion values by moral context (SI Appendix, Table S8). We therefore also used
this functional response in the thalamus as an additional functional ROI to
corroborate our anatomical thalamus ROI that showed responses to Other
PE > Self PE. We also applied a false discovery rate correction (FDR) for the
number of ROI corrections. All ROI comparisons remained significant (P < 0.05)
when controlling for the number of comparisons using FDR.
Data Availability. All anonymized behavioral data and code used to generate
the figures can be downloaded at OSF (https://osf.io/3stp9/files/). All code
used to run the computational modeling can be downloaded at OSF (https://
osf.io/3stp9/files/). Unthresholded statistical maps can be downloaded at
NeuroVault (https://identifiers.org/neurovault.collection:8797).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This work was supported by a Medical Research Council
Fellowship (MR/P014097/1), a Christ Church Junior Research Fellowship, and a
Christ Church Research Centre Grant to P.L.L. and a Wellcome Trust grant
(106164/A/14/Z) and an Academy of Medical Sciences (SBF001\1008) grant to






































M.J.C. M.C.K.-F. was supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Fellowship (103184/Z/13/
Z). The Wellcome Centre for Integrative Neuroimaging is supported by core
funding from the Wellcome Trust (203139/Z/16/Z). We thank Ms. Eloise Copland
and Dr. Hongbo Yu for assistance with data collection; Dr. Marco Wittman,
Dr. Peter Smittenaar, Dr. Quentin Huys, Dr. Elsa Fouragnan, and Dr. Mehdi
Keramati for assistance with data analysis; and Dr. Matthew Apps, Prof.
Nathaniel Daw, Prof. Peter Dayan, Dr. Wouter Kool, Dr. Thomas Akam, and
Ms. Mary Montgomery for helpful discussions. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
1. B. Gert, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, (Oxford University Press, 2004).
2. K. Gray, L. Young, A. Waytz, Mind perception is the essence of morality. Psychol. Inq.
23, 101–124 (2012).
3. M. J. Crockett, Models of morality. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 363–366 (2013).
4. M. J. Crockett, J. Z. Siegel, Z. Kurth-Nelson, P. Dayan, R. J. Dolan, Moral transgressions
corrupt neural representations of value. Nat. Neurosci. 20, 879–885 (2017).
5. M. J. Crockett, Z. Kurth-nelson, J. Z. Siegel, P. Dayan, R. J. Dolan, Harm to others
outweighs harm to self in moral decision making. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112,
17320–17325 (2015).
6. F. Cushman, V. Kumar, P. Railton, Moral learning: Psychological and philosophical
perspectives. Cognition 167, 1–10 (2017).
7. J. Decety, J. M. Cowell, Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for
morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective. Dev. Psychopathol. 30, 153–164
(2018).
8. F. Cushman, K. Gray, A. Gaffey, W. B. Mendes, Simulating murder: The aversion to
harmful action. Emotion 12, 2–7 (2012).
9. R. J. R. Blair, The neurobiology of psychopathic traits in youths. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 14,
786–799 (2013).
10. L. Kohlberg, Stages in the Development of Moral Thought and Action, (Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, New York, 1969).
11. R. E. Tremblay, The development of agressive behaviour during childhood: What have
we learned in the past century? Int. J. Behav. Dev. 24, 129–141 (2000).
12. J. Henrich, S. J. Heine, A. Norenzayan, The weirdest people in the world? Behav. Brain
Sci. 33, 61–83, discussion 83–135 (2010).
13. F. Gino, S. Ayal, D. Ariely, Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The
effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychol. Sci. 20, 393–398 (2009).
14. J. M. Nolan, P. W. Schultz, R. B. Cialdini, N. J. Goldstein, V. Griskevicius, Normative
social influence is underdetected. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 34, 913–923 (2008).
15. M. K. Wittmann, P. L. Lockwood, M. F. S. Rushworth, Neural mechanisms of social
cognition in primates. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 41, 99–118 (2018).
16. W. Schultz, Updating dopamine reward signals. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 23, 229–238
(2013).
17. P. Dayan, N. D. Daw, Decision theory, reinforcement learning, and the brain. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 8, 429–453 (2008).
18. R. S. Sutton, A. G. Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction, (MIT Press, 1998).
19. J. P. O’Doherty, J. Cockburn, W. M. Pauli, Learning, reward, and decision making.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 68, 73–100 (2017).
20. N. D. Daw, S. J. Gershman, B. Seymour, P. Dayan, R. J. Dolan, Model-based influences
on humans’ choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron 69, 1204–1215 (2011).
21. N. Drummond, Y. Niv, Model-based decision making and model-free learning. Curr.
Biol. 30, R860–R865 (2020).
22. J. Gläscher, N. Daw, P. Dayan, J. P. O’Doherty, States versus rewards: Dissociable
neural prediction error signals underlying model-based and model-free reinforce-
ment learning. Neuron 66, 585–595 (2010).
23. S. W. Lee, S. Shimojo, J. P. O’Doherty, Neural computations underlying arbitration
between model-based and model-free learning. Neuron 81, 687–699 (2014).
24. K. Wunderlich, P. Dayan, R. J. Dolan, Mapping value based planning and extensively
trained choice in the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 15, 786–791 (2012).
25. E. Tricomi, B. W. Balleine, J. P. O’Doherty, A specific role for posterior dorsolateral
striatum in human habit learning. Eur. J. Neurosci. 29, 2225–2232 (2009).
26. N. D. Daw, Y. Niv, P. Dayan, Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal and
dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711
(2005).
27. W. Kool, F. A. Cushman, S. J. Gershman, When does model-based control pay off?
PLoS Comput. Biol. 12, e1005090 (2016).
28. F. Cushman, Action, outcome, and value: A dual-system framework for morality. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 17, 273–292 (2013).
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